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l Introduction 
In our hectic society and globalizing business world, the word 'transparency' 
has recently caught the imagination of producers, marketers and citizens. It 
is appearing in titles of papers and books. Business scandals lead to calls for 
transparency of companies in the media (sceptically received by some; see e.g. 
Van der Zwan (2002). World leaders are depicted at conferences with trans-
parent bottles of mineral water. Transparency denotes clarity, purity, integ-
rity. 
The word transparency actually carries a family of possible meanings. 
Borgman (2002) claims he uses it as a 'guiding design principle' for the 
design of 'simple, effective and flexible information systems within and 
between organisations'. In business, the notions of'value transparency' and 
'product transparency' at the interfaces between business partners are used. 
'Network transparency' is thought to be a prerequisite for responsiveness of 
supply chains. 
In this chapter we define transparency as follows (abbreviated from Hofst-
ede, 2002b): Transparency of a netchain is the extent to which all the netchain's stake-
holders have access to the information that they request. A more elaborate definition 
is presented below. Note the use of'netchain' as a contraction of'chain' and 
'network' (after Lazzarini et al., 2001). We use the term netchain to denote an 
institutional arrangement between at least three partners that is neither a 
hierarchy nor a market but a hybrid structure with a mix of long-term con-
tracts, internal markets and informal co-operation in which goods, money, 
information and affective signals are exchanged (see figure 1). 
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Figure 1 The spectrum of institutional mechanisms (from Powell, 1990, p. 25; Diederen 
and Jonkers, 2001). The corners of the triangle depict ideal types while the 
surface connotes the various mixes of institutional mechanisms that can occur 
in a netchain 
hierarchy 
network market 
Transparency affects many stakeholders. Consumers, various types of compa-
nies, citizens and governments all have different perspectives on transpar-
ency. Because transparency implies information exchange between various 
stakeholders, these different perspectives have to be addressed and recon-
ciled. As a rule, transparency should enable connectivity, or being able to 
react to one another's processes - as e.g. in collaborative planning. 
The chapter first examines the perspectives of a number of stakeholder 
groups. After the various perceptions we shall take a closer look at current 
practices aimed at improving transparency. Two sectors serve as examples: 
the food sector, historically leading in the field, and the health care sector, of 
great public significance. Because these sectors are so different, the reader 
will be in a position to extrapolate those issues that are generic to both of 
them to other sectors of interest. Finally we explore promises that the con-
cept holds for the future. When the buzz has subsided, what will be left of 
transparency? 
Transparency is of obvious societal relevance in the two sectors of this chap-
ter. Its importance in the food sector needs hardly be argued. The Dutch 
spend 30 billion euro per year on food, most of which has crossed borders. 
Recent food scares that have disturbed rural areas and economies in Europe, 
as well as the general public, could have been contained much better 
through better knowledge of animal movements - and would have been 
much worse in the absence of any such knowledge. The health sector being 
much more nationally organized than the food sector, we take the Dutch 
example in this chapter. Compared to the Dutch health care sector, the food 
sector is eminently transparent. Consequences of lack of transparency in the 
health care sector are obvious to those who have had to visit several hospital 
departments for the same complaints. Less anecdotally, Schut (2003) cites 
numerous projects that show how organizational and budget structures in 
hospitals effectively provide barriers to transparency, causing vast losses of 
money. 
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1.1 Food sector 
Large companies in many sectors have been developing transparent proce-
dures for decades. The food sector has a number of special attributes that 
caused it to take the lead in public awareness about developing transparency. 
Perishability of foodstuffs has been an incentive for producers to co-operate 
in chains. This holds particularly in the Netherlands with its agricultural tra-
dition and egalitarian society. Public concern for health has been a direct 
driver towards transparency, since consumers want to be certain that they 
are buying safe food. Recently, governments have become active in the field, 
both nationally and transnationally. As of January 1, 2005 the European 
Union's General Food Law (Commission of the European Communities, 2002) 
enforces traceability in the food sector. Other sectors and laws follow. Compa-
nies in the food chain are not awaiting these changes passively. Quality sys-
tems, certification and branding are in full swing among producers, manu-
facturers and retailers (see e.g. Grievink et al., 2002). 
As far as netchain structure is concerned, the food sector is straightfor-
ward and to a large extent linear. The system consists of actors such as pro-
ducers, manufacturers, distributors and retailers. Three main streams flow 
through the system. Produce flows from 'farm to fork', while money flows in 
the opposite direction. Information, the subject matter of transparency, 
flows in more directions and may be stored in shared databases. Service pro-
viders and material suppliers are also involved. Together these actors can 
engage in communication about logistics, risk allocation or innovation. Gov-
ernment attempts to regulate the sector, both at the level of primary produc-
tion and through food legislation. A sample netchain is shown in figure 2. 
Figure 2 A netchain in the Dutch egg sector (from Hofstede, 2003). A rectangle indicates 
a company or other institution, the oval indicates the netchain as a whole. 
Arrows indicate product flows. Money flows in the opposite sense while 
information is shared throughout the netchain 
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One or two companies of each type make up the netchain of figure 2. Chicks 
stay in the hatchery for three weeks. Then they are sold to the nursery, where 
they stay seventeen weeks and grow into hens. They are then sold to the lay-
ing hen factory to lay eggs for over one year. The factory is highly optimized: 
one staff member can deal with 60.000 hens. The eggs are sold to the packing 
station, packed and sold to manufacturers and retailers. Feed providers and 
veterinarians provide feed and medical services, respectively. The product 
agency is responsible for both PR and good conduct of the sector. A number 
of parallel networks of similar composition exist in the Netherlands. 
Through improved communication, this particular netchain has enabled the 
participants to improve their supply chain logistics. Creating a better price 
for the eggs has so far been tricky because of the extreme 'commodity' image 
of eggs. Figure 2 is incomplete: it does not include the manufacturers that 
process part of the eggs, nor the retailers in whose outlets they are sold. Many 
of these retailers are not Dutch. The average food item we Europeans con-
sume travels 3000 to 4000 kilometres before reaching our plates (Luttikhuis, 
2002). 
1.2 Health care sector 
The health care sector employs ten percent of our work force and is by far our 
largest public sector, with a turnover in 2003 of 44 billion euro. It is about as 
different a sector from the food sector as you can get, although recent devel-
opments in functional foods bring the two closer together. These force con-
sumers, producers and legislators to consider the role of food in health care 
and the boundary between food and medicine. 
A very salient feature of the health sector as it is organized in the Nether-
lands and similar countries is that the 'consumer' does not pay for the 'prod-
uct' directly. Figure 3 elucidates this. 
Figure 3 is obviously a gross simplification. For instance, banks, pharmacies 
and numerous service organizations are not shown, nor the manifold sub-
bodies of government and medical profession, the variety of relations 
between hospitals and medical professionals, nor the division of health care 
in three compartments. Step 5, 'pays bill', is also a complex one in reality due 
to a four-tier system. Non-insurable risks are tier one. They are covered by law 
(AWBZ). Most common risks are covered by obligatory basic insurance, tier 2 
(Ziekenfonds). Tier 3 consists of optional extra insurance. Tier four, finally, 
consists of own costs to be carried by patients or privately insured. 
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Figure 3 Flows of information, service and money in the Health Care sector. Step 3, 'send 
bill' can occur either to the patient or to the insurance company. Arrows show 
the sense of reading the text along the lines 
may vote for. 
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Even taking into account these simplifications, figure 3 shows that in health 
care there is no question of the near-linear structure with opposite flows of 
products and money that characterises the food sector. This has radical 
effects on the incentive structure of the actors in the netchain. In food chains 
all actors have a strong incentive to be cost-effective. This is not the case in 
health care. Consumers are not rewarded for cost-effective behaviour. Neither 
are care providers. Doctors operating on fixed budgets, for instance, have no 
incentive to help patients above their quota. Yet at country level all are con-
cerned about exponentially rising costs and long waiting lists. All this makes 
for a sector the operation of which is difficult to understand, let alone con-
trol. 
1.3 Key concepts 
Let us return to the definition of transparency in netchains and elaborate on 
it so as to define key concepts for this chapter. Much of this material is taken 
from Hofstede (2002b). The full definition of transparency in a netchain is as 
follows: 
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Transparency of a netchain is the extent to which all the netchain's stakeholders 
have a shared understanding of, and access to, the product-related Information 
that they request, without loss, noise, delay and distortion. 
In this definition, 
- netchain (Lazzarini et al. 2001 ) is a directed network of actors who co-operate 
to bring a product to customers; 
- a netchain actor is an organization, usually a producer, distributor, proces-
sor or retailer; 
- a stakeholder is a netchain actor, or an institutional actor with some stake 
in the netchain, or a customer; 
- a shared understanding is a precondition for transparency that involves shar-
ing or seamless translation of language, meaning and standards at many 
levels: 
• a shared language, 
• shared interpretation of key concepts, 
• shared standards for product quality, 
• shared reference information models, 
• shared technological infrastructure; 
- product is a product, possibly an information product, or a service; 
- product-related information is meant in the widest sense. It includes 'techni-
cal' attributes such as information about raw materials used and produc-
tion process attributes. But it also includes 'value-related' attributes (Hof-
stede et al. 2003) such as labour circumstances or environmental impacts. 
It can serve various aims, e.g. preserving identity, food safety, or adding 
value; 
- loss means that an actor does not transmit information. It affects complete-
ness; 
- noise means that an actor adds non-relevant data to the information. It 
affects relevancy. This is a subjective notion. Noise can point to lack of 
agreement among actors as to what information is relevant; 
- delay means that an actor delays information. It affects timeliness; 
- distortion means that an actor changes the information either by accident 
or on purpose, or fails to update it if the product changes, so that the infor-
mation no longer actually describes the product. It affects validity. 
If the netchain's stakeholders did not request information, there would be no 
reason to make the netchain transparent. Therefore, knowing what informa-
tion the stakeholders need is a precondition for transparency. This is why the 
definition specifies all the netchain's stakeholders and the information (...) that they 
request. 
The stakeholders can only exchange information if they have a shared lan-
guage. In fact sharing or seamless translation of language, meaning and 
standards is needed at many levels, as indicated in the definition by the 
clause a shared understanding. 
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1-4 An inter-discipline 
Table 1 
The definition of transparency leaves out some important elements. For 
instance, who decides who counts as a stakeholder? This brings us to the nec-
essary interdisciplinary nature of the study of transparency. In table 1, we list 
some of the most relevant contributing disciplines, questions about transpar-
ency in netchains that might be asked from their perspective, and for some 
of these, searchlight theories that could throw light on these questions. This 
list is by no means exhaustive. It serves to indicate the multifaceted nature of 
transparency as a research issue. Note that some of the disciplines in table 1 
are themselves inter-disciplines of recent origin; perhaps chain and network 
studies will acquire the same status. Some of the theories are not consistent 
bodies, or they might be contested, while others are well established. Many 
theories that are not mentioned could also be useful. The table serves to show 
that one needs a mixed bag of tools to study netchains. 
Theories, possible research questions from their perspective, and possibly 
contributing bodies of theory (a searchlight theory is a theory that is not being 
built or tested through research but used as a tool to shed light on the object of 
study) 
Discipline 
Engineering 
ICT 
Law 
Economics 
Social psychology 
Marketing 
Organization studies 
Political science 
Relevant issue 
With what technology to capture data? 
How to manage data? 
How to allocate ownership of innovations? 
How to divide costs and benefits? 
How to allocate chain responsibilities? 
Where must trust supplement contracts? 
Why do some solutions not work across borders? 
What information do customers want? How deliv-
ered? How motivated? 
How much can one ask for products? 
What transparency makes a netchain successful? 
How to organise a netchain efficiently? 
Whose interest do netchains serve? 
Searchlight theory 
Design 
Data and process modelling 
Intellectual property rights 
Transaction cost theory 
Institutional economics 
Came theory 
Culture theory 
Consumer behaviour 
Pricing theory 
Actor network theory 
Logistics 
Critical theory 
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1.5 Effects 
Ideally, transparency leads to responsiveness of the netchain to outside events. 
It notably enables 
- producers to anticipate market demand accurately; 
- intermediate netchain actors to plan their capacity accurately; 
- quality control actors (e.g. various governments) to quickly take action 
when defects surface so that the origin is traced and spreading of the prob-
lem can be curtailed; 
- customers to assess where their purchase comes from and what quality-
and value-related attributes it possesses. 
In reality, another effect could also occur. The investments in common stand-
ards and infrastructure could entail that actors are faced with high barriers 
to leaving the netchain. This could lead to loss of flexibility in the market. 
In relation to the previous, at a psychological level the 'we' of a netchain 
creates a 'they'. In industries with strong incentives towards netchain forma-
tion, competition is likely to shift from between-company to between-
netchain. A similar effect, at country level this time, occurs in health care 
where consumers who live near the Belgian and German borders flee to hos-
pitals across the border where there are no waiting lists. 
Perceptions 
A netchain has a different meaning to each stakeholder involved in it. For a 
comprehensive view, one needs to be able to combine and reconcile the vari-
ous actors' points of view. We shall now discuss the perspectives of some key 
stakeholders in both sectors. 
2.1.1 Food: consumers 
Ultimately, a netchain has to serve the needs of its consumers. In the food sec-
tor the consumers 'vote with their feet' by failing to buy what they don't like, 
don't trust, do not hear about, or do not want to pay for. 
It is frequently claimed that today's consumers are fickle and that their 
wishes change all the time. We believe that if one uses appropriate social sci-
entific theory, this turns out not to be the case. Consumers may vary in the 
specific products they buy, as they are forced to because shop contents 
change through marketing and innovation activities. Other context factors, 
e.g. economic developments and political events, also impinge on purchasing 
behaviour. But below that level there are stable motivators for consumers' 
purchasing behaviour. These reside in value-related factors at the level of 
social groups. De Mooij (2000, 2001) carried out meta-analyses of European 
consumption data for a large number of product categories from 1980,1991 
and 2001, including food. Contrary to the predictions of those who believe 
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that globalization will lead to global values, she found that over this twenty-
year period, consumption patterns converge only up to a certain point when 
countries become wealthier. Past this point, with converging incomes in 
richer countries, value-related differences become more manifest. In De 
Mooij's words (2001, p. 305): 'When people possess more or less enough of eve-
rything, they will spend their incremental income on what best fits their 
value pattern. The ultimate deal of Americans is the five-car garage, the 
Dutch will buy more luxurious caravans (holiday trailers) and the Spanish 
will eat out even more than they do now.' De Mooij is comparing country-
level societies here. But similar processes operate for social subgroups within 
a country. 
Hofstede (2002a) interviewed 136 young adults from 36 countries studying 
abroad about their food preferences. On average these people consumed like 
young urban professionals: they eat what they like and disregard what their 
parents or their religion would prescribe. But country-level averages for 
eightteen countries with three or more respondents show that in fact the 
national culture of the respondent's country of origin is a strong predictor of 
food habits, notably the country's collectivism and uncertainty avoidance. A 
Russian respondent put the collectivist attitude into words as follows: '(...) I 
think eating is something I am very accustomed to doing in the company of 
others. To me a meal is more of a social event than just a bare satisfaction of 
nutritional requirements.' Under such an assumption, food choice in a super-
market becomes an issue of little importance to a customer indeed. The 
uncertainty avoiding point of view was exemplified in answers to the ques-
tion 'Is there food you will never eat?' Many food items from foreign coun-
tries were mentioned with revulsion or disgust for a reason, while almost no 
reference was being made to food safety issues. 
2.1.2 Food: producers 
In agriculture, producers are normally known as farmers. To farmers, trans-
parency usually implies requirements to gather production data and to com-
ply with standards of safety, quality or hygiene, e.g. HACCP (Hazard Analysis 
and Critical Control Points). Where farmers are SMEs (Small or Medium Sized 
Enterprises) they have very little influence, and their choice is to 'comply or 
die'. Whether they reap any benefits from the exercise other than remaining 
in business is doubtful. This is true for many farmers in developing countries, 
see e.g. Engel (2002). Under such circumstances, transparency would mean 
insight into the markets in far-away countries where their customers reside; 
but better organization and access to funds for investment are likely to be 
more important. In the Netherlands, farmers traditionally have strong posi-
tions due to their high degree of organization into co-operatives. In figure 2, 
for instance, the Product Agency is a sector-created body that creates a public 
face for the sector. At European level, the primary agriculture sector is heav-
ily subsidized, to the point of being one of the EU's main reasons for 
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existence. Subsidies, as well as increasing safety and quality requirements, 
constitute trade barriers for non-EU countries, particularly poorer ones. 
2.1.3 Food: manufacturers and retailers 
Manufacturers and retailers have very different and complementary roles in 
the food netchain. Many manufacturers are small or medium sized enter-
prises. Yet a number of large manufacturers exist that share some important 
characteristics with retailers. Both are large to very large international com-
panies and both attempt to capture market share through branding. Because 
of this last fact, their mutual relationships bear an element of competition. 
It is expected that in the next ten years the trend towards increasing empha-
sis on fresh foods in supermarkets will give retailers an edge over manufac-
turers (Grievink et al., 2002, p. 453). 
To retailers, transparency is an important marketing device. They can use 
it to provide information with their merchandise, promoting an image of 
quality and reliability. The main effect is likely not to be better prices but 
increased market share. Retailers tend to anticipate the actions of both con-
sumers and citizens, and the latter force retailers into action around value-
related quality attributes such as worker conditions, child labour, use of 
GMOs, use of pesticides and animal welfare. 
Manufacturers are forced to establish traceahili^i in order to improve food 
safety. This is simply required to remain iiyMsiness. The European General 
Food Law, to become effective on January 1, 2005, requires 'farm to fork' 
traceability in the food sector. Some manufacturers are pro-actively working 
on traceability systems, e.g. Nutreeo, active in pork, chickens and salmon. 
Nutreco do not think that traceability will fetch them a better price with the 
retailers. If at all, retailers are only willing to pay more for safer food, not for 
other issues. This seems paradoxical if one considers that in bacteriological 
terms our food has never been safer than it is today. The paradox can be 
explained by acknowledging that public perception is only very partially 
formed on the basis of facts but rather on salience. If something happens it 
is not geographically contained and receives broad media attention. 
2.1.4 Food: citizens and governments 
Consumers also play the role of citizens, e.g. when they assemble in NGOs 
and try to influence public opinion or take institutional action, or if they are 
members of governments. The type of concerns voiced by citizens, and the 
types of actions in which they engage, vary strongly across countries. In line 
with their value system, Dutch citizens and governments are comparatively 
much concerned with sustainabiliry issues, not very afraid of innovations 
such as GMO food, and not very concerned with taste and provenance of food, 
but rather with price. Citizens in EU countries with higher uncertainty avoid-
ance, e.g. Latin countries, tend to be much more particular about food safety 
294 
TRANSPARENCY: PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES A N D PROMISES 
issues, and to value locally produced food. Of course trade interests of coun-
tries co-determine their attitude to issues such as GMO and diseases. Often 
self-interested country policies are couched in language that appeals to the 
local constituency. 
Recent attention for food safety has called international governments into 
action. The General Food Law of the European Union ('GFL', EC Regulation no 
178/2002) is one of the most noticeable effects. As of 1 January 2005, this 
wide-ranging, comprehensive law requires full traceability for foodstuff. Lim-
iting the spread of diseases and the scope of recalls are the primary objectives 
of this law. In larger animals, traceability will be required at the level of the 
individual animal. In fruit, carton level traceability is required. 
In practice, it is not likely that the GFL will be enforceable right from the 
beginning. Traceability systems across company boundaries are only begin-
ning to operate and will no doubt face their moments of truth in future food 
scares. The GFL does act as a powerful trade barrier to those who have no con-
nection to powerful netchains, and as a political instrument in food markets. 
2.1.5 F o ° d ; hybrid organizations 
In Dutch society there is no very sharp distinction between public and pri-
vate organizations. Private organizations have a habit of creating horizontal 
branch organizations (e.g. Land- en Tuinbouworganisatie (LTO) for farmers and 
growers, Nederlandse Voedingsmiddelenindustrie (VAI) for producers, Centraal 
Bureau Levenmiddelenhandel for retailers) that represent their interests and 
closely work with governments. In other cases (e.g. Product Boards, Product-
schappen) representation bodies are created j ointly by government and private 
organizations. Typically these hybrid organizations are pro-active with 
regard to legislation and market trends and take initiatives in contacting 
other stakeholders in the sector. This much facilitates network-centred sys-
tem innovations in a sector. This structure also has symbolic value: it means 
that the participating companies have invested a small part of their inde-
pendence in the hybrid organization. In order to participate in netchains, 
they will have to do the same but to a larger degree. In countries with a weak 
public infrastructure or without co-operative tradition, achieving a better 
degree of organization among sibling stakeholders, e.g. among producers, 
may be required before taking other steps. Alternatively, individual large 
companies might be the units of netchains, and they would use private, not 
hybrid governance. 
2.2.1 Health care: consumers 
Consumers in health care are dramatically voiceless compared to the same 
consumers when it comes to buying food. There is hardly a choice of doctors 
for them, and information asymmetry makes it impossible for them to assess 
whether the cure or care they receive is adequate. The Scientific Institute of 
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Dutch apothecaries estimate that 90.000 people are hospitalized yearly in the 
Netherlands because of wrong medication (Confidential Report, 2003). Yet 
there is no information about the quality of medication per doctor or per 
hospital to be had for the unfortunate consumer. 
Insurance companies, in contrast, do provide information to customers in 
their efforts to gain market share. But this information only specifies the 
type of health care, and is detached from the who and where ofthat care. 
Health consumers are markedly stratified. Age is of course the biggest 
stratifying factor, with huge health care consumption in the first and last 
months of people's lives. But other factors count as well, and are less well 
understood. A Dutch example in the health care sector concerns the high 
consumption of care by immigrant Turkish and Moroccan populations even 
when corrected for socio-economic status (Huiskamp et al., 2001). Figures for 
frequency of visits to general practitioners for Dutch and various immigrant 
groups correlate with the country of provenance's 'uncertainty avoidance'. 
Uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 2001) - a measure of a society's fear of the 
unknown - is known to be stable across generations. Across countries it is sta-
tistically strongly related to the psychological 'big five' personality dimen-
sion of anxiety. 
2.2.2 Health care: medical professionals 
Doctors have historically been almost all-powerful within their domain of 
expertise. They are not in the habit of being checked upon or of having to 
compete with one another for the favours of prospective patients. Over the 
last decades, government and hospitals have tried to strengthen their grasp 
on them. The current system budgets the salaries of specialists to an expected 
number of medical proceedings per year. Excess productivity is not paid for. 
This leaves them without an incentive to try and eliminate the waiting lists 
that exist for patients. 
2.2.3 Health care: hospitals 
Hospitals face huge, costly bureaucratic overload. There is no unique coding 
system for patients. This prevents effective transfer of patient data across the 
medical chain. Informatization of the medical sector has stagnated over the 
last decade. Currently, efforts to create a good infrastructure at national level 
are under way that could improve this state of affairs (Confidential Report, 
2003). 
Another area in which much can be gained is the logistics of supporting 
processes, e.g. of medical material provision. Due to lack of co-ordination 
expensive, perishable stock of materials is kept in too many places. 
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2.2.4 Health care: insurance companies 
Insurance companies make the financial side of the health care system run 
smoothly by moderating the relation between hospitals and consumers. They 
calculate the insurability and needed premiums for various treatments. The 
continuous creation of new treatments with unknown risks requires them to 
keep reassessing their offer. 
Due to their size and limited number, the insurers have a strong position. 
The government can regulate their offer but cannot afford to put them under 
too much pressure. It expects them to both control quality and efficiency of 
care in future, acting in the interest of the citizens. Currently they mostly 
move money. 
2.2.5 Health care: citizens and governments 
Health care is government-financed; not through taxes but mainly through 
premiums: collective insurance ('ziekenfonds') premiums and AWBZ premi-
ums account for three quarters of the budget (X 2003). 
The government attempts to maintain the solidarity of insurers with weak 
customer segments. It created collective insurance for lower-income groups, 
and it presses insurance companies to keep insuring expensive categories of 
patients, while insurers will attempt to acquire the consumer segments that 
require little health care. 
Several aspects of health care have been politically controversial. Exam-
ples are abortion, terminal care and treatment for people who willingly run 
health risks such as smoking or drug taking. Political controversy invariably 
makes reasoned policy difficult, favouring electoral considerations rather 
than long-term systemic ones. 
2.3 Moral 
The examples of consumer demands illustrate that values of groups of con-
sumers strongly shape their perceptions and demands. To provide acceptable 
goods and services it is vital to take these values into account. 
The perspectives of the various stakeholders show to what extent they live in 
different incentive structures. 
Both values and perspectives contribute to create arenas in which percep-
tion is more important than reality when it comes to improve a certain state of 
affairs. With respect to transparency the participants will only be willing to 
invest and make the most of it if they are aware of the larger system in which they 
function. Seeing the potential benefits for the netchain or sector as a whole is 
a precondition for increasing transparency, it would seem. But it is by no 
means the only one. 
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3 Practices 
The prime driver for transparency in the food sector has been food safety. For 
health care it is economic necessity and patient welfare. This has led to a 
focus on traceability in the food sector. The health care sector lags behind. 
This section will therefore concentrate on the food sector. 
In this section we first review the 'raw material' of transparency from an 
information modelling point of view. Then we turn to the lessons learned 
from a number of pilot projects in the food sector. 
3.1 Product information for traceability 
Traceability consists of tracking the course of a product through the 
netchain while it is being produced, or tracing back the history of a product 
after the fact. In cases of recalls both backward tracing to the origin of a sus-
pect product and forward tracing to all consumer outlets of that origin are 
needed. The starting point for a recall is a consumer's complaint (e.g. allergic 
reaction to milk, a recent Dutch case); then the chain is traced until the cause 
is found (here: antibiotics residues in the milk). From that point all other 
products that might have been affected by the same cause are recalled (in this 
case: half-skimmed milk of one date in two retail chains). Product-related 
information, in the context of a netchain, can refer to various types of infor-
mation from various sources. There will be particularities for each individual 
netchain. Yet a general-purpose classification can serve as a starting-point for 
finding information that is to become transparent in a netchain. All these 
types of information pertain to a smallest homogeneous product unit. It is 
crucial for a netchain to agree on such a unit, usually termed 'lot' or 'batch'. 
The smaller the unit size, the better it can serve to limit recalls and other dis-
turbances. A smallest traceable unit is defined on the basis of a number of 
'generating properties', i.e. those properties for which all elements of the 
unit must share the same value. For each smallest traceable product unit, the 
following needs to be known: 
1 Identifier 
Identity preservation of products or batches can tax the administration of 
a netchain, particularly primary producers. More and more, identifying 
information is shipped with the product automatically. Animals are ear-
tagged with an identifier, or it could be subcutaneously entered. There are 
plans to use DNA routinely for identification purposes. 
2 Inherent product properties 
These can be seen or otherwise measured on the product. Most inherent 
properties are dynamic, meaning they can change over time. These 
include e.g. taste, content of chemical components, bacteriological status, 
visual attractiveness. Some are not likely to change, e.g. size. Some never 
do, e.g. provenance data. Provenance can be contestable, though; 'Parma-
ham' can be made by slaughtering Dutch pigs in Italy. 
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3 Process properties 
These constitute the history of what has happened to a unit. If units are 
combined, for instance on the basis of equal inherent properties, then you 
get units with non-homogeneous process properties, which may become a 
problem when tracing product provenance through the netchain, e.g. in 
the case of a recall. Properties of means of production used on the product 
are a special case. This includes machines and labour. In the case of 
machines, contamination issues can arise. For instance, if a machine is 
used for non-GM seed after having been used for GM seed, very rigorous 
cleaning is necessary. In the case of labour, ethical issues can arise, as 
when customers refuse to buy products because they suspect that children 
have been used to produce it. 
In the case of products that are made up of components, many data have 
a recurrent element in that they hold for each sub-product in the product 
decomposition tree. This property makes it possible to model that decom-
position tree at an abstract level so that one entity can represent compo-
nents at any level in the tree. 
It is quickly apparent, given this classification, that there is a complex design 
aspect in providing transparency. Adding the requirement that the netchain 
be still open to entry of new partners makes this even clearer. Generic infor-
1
 mation models or architectures that can serve as open standards may allevi-
ate this problem. Open data standards do not force process standardization, 
while enabling interoperability, so they are a good basis for flexible network 
structures. 
A skeleton data model for tracking and tracing taken from Hofstede 
(2002c) is shown below. Figure 4 shows a hypothetical history of product 
batches that are both split and joined at various points throughout the 
chain. Figure 5 shows an Access database for this case. Figure 6 shows a UML 
class diagram capable of modelling the general case of which figures 4 and 5 
provide an example. 
Figure 4 Splitting and joining of lots in a production chain 
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Figure 5 A database for the lots in figure 4. The top window shows the two-table 
structure with each LOT associated to many SPLIT OR JOINS, and with table LOT 
represented twice. The bottom left shows the contents of table LOT, bottom 
right those of table SPLIT OR JOIN 
r -• 11 -r u'. : cnild- ot ; 
1 
4 5 
O K T T ^ I 
01-JJ1-021 
1 
1 
' n-02B 
. n - 0 2 | 
Figure 6 A UML class diagram for the core of a traceability data model, showing no 
implementation details. There is one i-to-many aggregation relationship of a 
STUNT (Smallest Traceable UniT) with its predecessors (with split and join 
symmetrically modelled), and one many-to-many associative relationship PRET 
(Process EvenT) between STUNTs. The label <> indicates that the actual 
properties have to be substituted. For UML syntax see e.g. Stevens (2000) 
SMALLEST TRACEABLE UNIT 
(stunt-id. creation-time, 
creating pret, <inherent 
properties>) 
PROCESS EVENT 
(pret-id, <process 
properties:») 
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Figure 6 includes an aspect lacking from figures 4 and 5, which is the many-
to-many association of STUNTs in a process event. This might e.g. be the 
slaughtering of a batch of pigs. The figure shows that the data structure back-
bone for a tracking & tracing system is not very complex. Complexity resides 
in three other facets. 
First, the actual inherent and process properties may be complex in struc-
ture and hard to get by, or it may be costly to collect them. See e.g. Beulens 
(2003) for examples of complexity in detail. 
Second, a coherent data architecture has to be adopted by as many organ-
izations as participate in a netchain - in fact they would have to be harmo-
nized per sector. The problem of mutually reconciling different item specifi-
cation dimensions has been termed semantic reconciliation. A KLICT study 
on semantic reconciliation (CHASE: Chain Services in ICT, see www.klict.org) 
concludes that a technological solution is only part of the story, and that 
agreeing on common mode of communication remains crucial. 
A third problem in practice is which of the data should actually travel 
with the product. The minimum requirement is to have the STUNT-id of the 
last STUNTs travel with the product. Descriptive information can be decou-
pled from these identifiers to protect the interests of its owners. The points 
in the netchain where this occurs are called information decoupling points 
(Trienekens and Beulens 2001). By entering STUNT-keys in the traceability sys-
tem, all other data can be retrieved. In this way one needs only use STUNT-
keys and other data remain hidden until there is a need for them, e.g. in case 
of calamities. A TTP (Trusted Third Party) could keep the actual data behind 
an encryption key, as e.g. in the British Foodtrak system (Wilson and Clarke 
1998). If a food scare does occur, it is of course necessary to retrieve the actual 
data fast, and a TTP could specialise in this. Not everybody in industry is 
enthusiastic about working with TTPs; some prefer direct business-to-busi-
ness arrangements. Having all inherent and process data available makes it 
possible to do analyses on them involving data mining algorithms, e.g. for 
early warning purposes about bacteriological quality. 
Other problems reside in the netchain's organization. For instance, netchains 
exist with minimum average quality requirements per batch where it is hard 
to get paid for top quality. Grains and eggs are examples. In these circum-
stances mixing good and poor batches is a common way to homogenise quality 
and avoid being stuck with low-quality batches - but it obviously has the effect 
of drastically increasing the size of the smallest traceable unit, de facto destroy-
ing traceability. 
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3.2 KLICT project results 
KLICT has sponsored a number of pilot projects on transparency. Some 
projects in the food sector are finished at the time of writing. We shall 
present a brief summary of results here. More documentation can be 
obtained at www.klict.org. 
3.2.1 Virtual organization in SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) 
This project involved the egg netchain of figure 2. In 2001, co-operating with 
KLICT and with two universities and two consulting firms, 8 SMEs in the 
Dutch egg sector decided to try and form a 'virtual organization'. The stated 
aim was to enhance co-operation in a virtual network while maintaining the 
independence of the actors and their freedom to entertain other business 
relations. Preventing food scares was one of the objectives, but achieving eco-
nomic benefits through branding and better responsiveness to the market 
was an important motivator. 
The actors knew one another very well but were used only to horizontal com-
munication, not to vertical integration. They worked with short-term informal 
arrangements, keeping dependency to a minimum. They saw one another regu-
larly but where work was concerned they talked price and quantity once a year 
and that was that. This is not so surprising, since the egg market has been a cost 
market in the extreme. The actors rather had the feeling of having one pie to 
share among them, and the fear that if they revealed vital information, others 
might use that to cut themselves a larger slice. As a result, the firms' willingness 
to share confidential knowledge turned out to vary widely. Having every partici-
pant sign a secrecy declaration and appointing a mediator helped build trust. 
The project yielded a 'Memorandum of Understanding and Principles' of largely 
symbolic value, and most participants decided to join in a follow-up project. 
Deciding on how to divide costs and benefits will be a tough nut to crack in the 
follow-up project. A prototype tracking and tracing system was delivered but not 
put into operation yet. Since the project, the participants talk weekly and 
exchange a variety of product-related information. 
The project report (Mevissen, 2002) mentions some critical success factors: 
involve people with decision-taking authority to keep momentum, and keep 
the project team constant to enhance trust. This latter result points to the 
fact that trust develops among people, not organizations. A netchain thus 
consists of three levels: the netchain as a whole, constituting organizations, 
and people in those organizations who actually co-operate. 
Another result merits attention. The participants became aware that 
despite their modest size, together they accounted for about thirty percent of 
the Dutch egg production. This made them realise that as a network they 
might wield some power against competitors or against the big retailers. Cre-
ating marketable value through branding remains hard in a commodity mar-
ket such as this one, and the netchain partners are still working on it. 
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A final noteworthy result is that the participants realized that staying inde-
pendent while forming a network was not possible. Even though they were 
free to do business on the side, the investment in infrastructure, data defini-
tion, and agreements bound them together and made exiting costly. 
To sum up, while immediate quantifiable results were not impressive, 
trust building was significant, and so was the acquisition by participants of 
a sense of agency at the level of the netchain. 
3.2.2 Fruit from South Africa to the Netherlands 
The FRUITFUL project (Van der Ham, 2002, Guis 2002) assembled ten indus-
trial partners, three funding parties and three research institutes. Its aim was 
to study possibilities for an integrative supply chain information system in 
the citrus and mango chains from South Africa to the Netherlands that could 
improve both logistics and quality. Such an information system had existed 
until 1997 in a typical hierarchical structure under control of only a few par-
ties. The market was deregulated then. With the big bosses gone, entrepre-
neurial chaos ensued and the central information system was abandoned. 
From 1999, it became clear to many that South Africa was rapidly losing its 
position on the international market. Some co-ordination had to be re-estab-
lished in order to keep up with international competition. 
Bottlenecks to reaching these aims were found not to lie on the technical 
side. Necessary information was available somewhere and realising connec-
tivity and transparency posed no technical problems. Agreeing on common 
goals and acting towards them rather than opportunistically proved to be 
more of a problem. The large number of participants did not help. They could 
not agree on a common infrastructure but instead decided to create a decen-
tralized system that focused on interfaces between proprietary systems and 
allowed limited transparency. This is an option that involves rather high 
transaction costs, but more integration was not acceptable. 
Getting the partners, and especially their key personnel, on speaking 
terms has been the most important first step. After this, showing the parties 
how much redundancy and inefficiency in information exchange was 
another major activity. For one sample chain it was shown that 35 docu-
ments (faxes, websites, e-mails, telephones, hard copy) were needed to cover 
the chain (grower - exporter - shipping line - terminal - importer - pack 
house). The consumer is not yet included in this chain. Subsequently stand-
ardization of messages and codes accounted for much of project activity. But, 
as was noted in the evaluation seminar, 'Within the project we just scratched 
the surface. The real work starts now.' 
The project shows that the historical context is a powerful constraint on 
any improvement in netchain governance. A question raised by this project 
is the unit of competition. Should it be the individual producer, the co-oper-
ation, the multinational company or the country? While the South African 
companies were competing against one another after the deregulation they 
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jointly lost ground against foreign competitors. In a price market, economies 
of scale are needed to survive. The South African fruit companies needed to 
co-operate. Their brand is 'South Africa', a strong one in the Netherlands, and 
the Dutch leaders of the FRUITFUL project advise them to join forces at coun-
try level for marketing and branding. 
3.2.3 Fresh produce in Thailand 
Ahold is working on local quality systems for fresh produce in Asian, African 
and Latin American countries. Recent economic developments have put a tem-
porary halt to these activities. One project that was completed is the TOPS 
project 'Best in Fresh' in Thailand (Boselie et al., 2003). TOPS was a joint venture 
of Ahold with a Thai retailer (CRC). The project involved a 'preferred supplier 
program' that forced suppliers (growers, wholesalers) to comply with certain 
minimum standards. Uncertain quality, long non-cooled storage upstream, fre-
quent out-of-stocks in the outlets, and too many small suppliers upon whom 
there was limited influence, are some of the problems tackled. A distribution 
centre (World Fresh) was built for quality control, washing, packaging and 
processing. HACCP and good agricultural practices were introduced in the 
chain. Mutual understanding by growers and retailers improved, and so did 
the distribution centre's service level. Standardized product carriers, pallets 
and roll containers were adopted. But unfortunately, the Thai market did not 
respond to the 'added value' created by the project. Also the project seems not 
to have been so successful at the level of interpersonal trust. Somewhat menac-
ingly, the project report states 'In a multinational and multicultural environ-
ment trust remains limited. If this is the case there is a need for other instru-
ments for monitoring and enforcement of agreements and standards'. 
After the Dutch left, the Thai fitted the system within their way of work-
ing. In the words of Boselie (2002, p. 25): 'Personalistic business relationships 
remain a latent threat to preferred supplier programs in environments that 
can be characterized by a high degree of informality'. In the language of the 
culture discussion above, measures issued from an individualist perspective 
don't automatically work in a collectivist context. So from a Thai perspective, 
the causality may be the other way around: preferred supplier programs are 
a threat to their social fabric. The project report specifies that the represent-
ative project members of all four Western companies involved have been 
replaced at least once. This is never beneficial, but it is a sure way to destroy-
ing interpersonal trust in partners with collectivist values where personal 
relationships, not relationships between firms, are the core of business. 
Thai food manager Wallaya Chirathivat of the family enterprise CRC (in 
Grievink et al. 2002) may have had TOPS in mind when she said: 'I think that 
it is very important to maintain an open mind and to pay special attention to 
the specific cultural conventions of doing business in foreign countries'. She 
also asserts 'A global brand can never penetrate the Thai food market*. The 
future will tell. 
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Summing up the learning from the three projects we see that in all three, 
netchain-level standardization of information was important but building 
stable operational relationships at the personal level was crucial. The morale 
seems to be 'when creating a business network, avoid replacing people'. On 
the economic side, the benefits are controllable internal efficiency gains and 
uncertain gains in the market. 
4 Promises 
Transparency has important promises to fulfil. In order to discuss these it is 
useful to distinguish three levels of transparency (after Hofstede 2003). But 
there are also threats and impediments involved that will be addressed in 
this section. 
4.1.1 History transparency 
This level is about knowing what has happened in the netchain. Its promise is to 
improve recall management and prevent calamities. It is also known as track-
ing and tracing or traceability. The technology is rapidly being put in place 
by companies in the food sector, particularly the large ones who feel the hot 
breath of the GFL traceability requirements that will become effective in 
2005. In health care the data infrastructure for keeping track of patient his-
tory is only partially in place so far. 
4.1.2 Operational transparency 
This level is about knowing what will happen across the netchain. It involves 
keeping netchain partners informed on one's logistics and other operational 
parameters. Its promise is to improve the efficiency reduce waiting times and 
stocks, and improve effectiveness and responsiveness of netchains. In the 
health care sector it is virtually non-existent now, and potential benefits are 
huge. Supply Chain Management and co-operative planning are examples of 
operational transparency. 
4.1.3 Strategy transparency 
This level is about deciding what may happen in the netchain. It involves crea-
tive investigation of the netchain's context to find opportunities and threats 
and to design adaptive responses. Joint innovation is a case in point. Strategic 
R&D alliances are vehicles for strategy transparency. 
Strategy transparency demands high levels of trust and are vulnerable on 
that account (see e.g. Omta and Van Rossum, 1999). The usual growth path in 
the food sector would be to start from history transparency. This forces 
netchain partners into contact and can be the opportunity to grow to 
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operational and perhaps to strategy transparency. In the health care and 
many other sectors, operational transparency would be the likely first step. 
Thus defined, transparency clearly stands out as more than just a buzzword. 
In order to make it happen, we should prepare for the future. One important 
opportunity in this regard is education. Our higher education can adopt a 
network perspective to make young people aware of various perspectives. 
One can e.g. give retail classes at agricultural schools. 
4.2 Threats to transparency 
Transparency is here to stay, as long as the influence of consumers on mar-
kets increases. It has its core domain in information modelling. Open stand-
ards, shared by all partners in a netchain and preferably in a sector, will allow 
for leaps forward in traceability in those sectors in which it serves public 
interests. But transparency has many faces and it is not a cure-all. We shall 
investigate the problematic aspects of transparency a bit further. 
4.2.1 Transparency can tilt power balance 
The effects of transparency are likely to vary strongly with netchain charac-
teristics. In fresh fruit netchains the netchain is in essence only an indirect 
way to match growers and consumers. Intermediate links (transporters, 
exporters, terminals, importers, retailers) merely collect and redistribute the 
product, but otherwise do not add value. In fact they sometimes destroy 
value through quality loss of the fruit. Transparency in such a chain, if it 
includes the grower and customer, is likely to result in streamlining and in a 
better position for these actors. In netchains of processed foods, the interme-
diate links do add value, and they have less to fear from transparency. They 
could in fact use it as a marketing tool. 
From another angle, transparency can be a political tool in the hands of 
powerful parties in netchains. Retailers are the obvious candidates for this 
role in the food sector. They can set standards and adopt a 'comply or die' 
strategy with small, unorganized producers. On the other hand the retailers 
could also help producers improve their practices for mutual benefit. The 
outcome of these power balance issues will depend largely on the role of con-
sumers, marketing departments and the media. We have more power as con-
sumers than we have as citizens (Kalshoven, 2003). Who succeeds in gaining 
public favour or, more crucially perhaps, avoiding disfavour? 
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4.2.2 Differences across institutional environments 
Private - public 
A divide runs between private and public netchains. Private ones have the 
problem of divided ownership. But at least they can agree on the centrality 
of economic rationality for taking decisions. In the food sector, the market 
chastises poor decision taking. In a public network, non-economic criteria 
take on far greater significance. One cannot agree to a health care system 
that withholds care from the poor. On the other hand, unlimited care for all 
is no longer payable at the national level. So painful choices of principle can-
not be avoided. The next problem is to put them into practice. 
Linear- non-linear 
The governance of a linear network is difficult enough. Dividing benefits, 
costs, and risks is tricky at the best of times. But if the network is far from lin-
ear the puzzle becomes confounded. In health care, three major and sepa-
rately governed binary markets operate between health care providers, insur-
ers and the public. How can government steer a car with three steering 
wheels? 
4.2.3 Complex networks are intractable 
Too many actors slow down change in any process. In a netchain there is no 
central authority that can delegate work. This makes them inherently intrac-
table. If structures of delegation, e.g. of data management or customer rela-
tionship management, can be created this will do much to improve things. 
Structures of control, on the other hand, can further slow down change. De 
Bruin (2003) convincingly argues that setting and tightly controlling per-
formance standards tends to be counterproductive. This is because it pun-
ishes risk-taking and innovative behaviours that are, by definition, not 
included in the performance criteria. 
4.2.4 Level playing field? 
It is a pitfall to pretend that transparency is the same thing all over the world. 
Anglo-dominated institutions like to create a 'level playing field' and see 
transparency as a means to that aim. But if one party has good shoes and the 
other has none, a level playing field will not help the shoeless ones (see Engel, 
2002). The GFL. acting as a Chinese wall to those who fail to comply, is a case 
in point. If transparency is to benefit international society, creating it should 
never be an aim in itself, but the historical, economic, institutional and 
social context needs to guide ambitions and progress. 
Playing field characteristics are largely nationally determined - e.g. are 
appointments kept, are they legally enforceable, is bribing acceptable or even 
necessary to get things done? Even very large companies cannot always 
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circumvent these national characteristics. They have to straddle the regula-
tions and value systems of the countries in which they operate. Ahold has a 
reputation of being one of the world's most international retailers (Grievink 
et al. 2002). Yet after recent failures in Argentina and the U.S., Ahold has 
become more cautious about globalizing. 
Conclusions 
Netchains emerge from this chapter as complex systems that are hard to com-
prehend, let alone govern. But the discussion makes it clear that if we wish 
to get a hold on netchains in general, a language is needed to talk about them 
from a system perspective. Transparency will be one of the important words 
in that language, regardless of sector. Without considering netchains as sys-
tems and describing them at system level we cannot hope to improve their 
functioning in a coherent way. 
It is at system level that transparency should be considered. A number of 
disciplinary perspectives need to be combined in a systemic perspective on 
the netchain as a whole. These include organization studies, human behav-
iour, law, economics, engineering and information technology. Technologi-
cal advances are often drivers. Information technology follows: in order to 
exchange tracking and tracing information it is necessary to standardise data 
formats or at least to make them interoperable. Processes usually need not be 
standardized, but outputs do. 
Practice shows that the technical side is not the bottleneck. Transparency 
requires good management, good legal systems, vision and trust. Without 
these, incentive systems will not favour transparency. 
Transparency sets preconditions for customer orientation, for responsive-
ness and for innovation of netchains. Its promises are huge but its ambition 
level is high because of the complexity of netchains and because of the trust 
among actors that is needed to realise transparency. 
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